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The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the
existence of reputational capital among Major League
Baseball teams.
Previous studies have shown that there is a
strong relationship between past performance and cur-
rent attendance at professional baseball games. Using
reputational capital as an explanation, this paper
provides a general discussion of this relationship.
The discussion of reputational capital is fol-
lowed by an empirical analysis which includes several
model specifications designed to show the effects of
past performance on current attendance. One series of
models uses cross-sectional data to measure the ef-
fects in general across the league and another series
of models uses time series data to show some specific
examples and how the relationship holds up through
time.
The results of the empirical study show that
there is generally a strong relationship between past
iii
performance and current attendance, although from
team-to-team the magnitude of the effect varies. Con-
sistent with economic and marketing theory, the re-
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Companies that market consumer products build a
reputation by producing quality products through time.
This reputation is in itself an intangible form of
capital which theoretically should have some effect on
the final demand for the product. Brand names like
International Business Machines, Mercedes Benz, and
Tylenol are instantly identified with quality due to
their past effectiveness and to some extent their ad-
vertising.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the
existence of reputational capital with Major League
Baseball teams. There will be a general discussion of
reputational capital and how it applies to various
products. An empirical analysis will follow, which
quantifies the relationship between reputation and de-
mand. This study offers a significant contribution to
the field of sports attendance analysis by combining
econometric analysis with marketing theory to explain
not only how baseball demand changes with changes in
winning percentage, but why those changes occur.
PREVIOUS LITERATURE
The economic literature in the field of sports
1
2
attendance is relatively small, but is continually
growing. Roger Noll's Government and the Sports Busi-
ness (1974), Gerald Scully's The Business of Ma or
League Baseball (1984), and James Whitney's "Winning
Games Versus Winning Championships: The Econcmics of
Fan Interest and Team Performance" (1988) provide a
solid background on the subject. The intention of
this thesis is to explain some of the previous works
using reputation as a hypothesis and to update other
works using the most recent data available.
The two prevalent theories are that baseball at-
tendance is directly related to either: a) current and
previous season winning percentage (Noll (1974), Scul-
ly (1984), Medoff (1976)); or, b) championship pros-
pects (Whitney (1988) Rottenberg (1956)). Although
the two are closely related, they are not the same
since a team may have quite a good winning percentage,
but no realistic chance at winning a pennant due to
the somewhat higher quality of another team in the
same division.
This paper will attempt to show the effects of
reputation on attendance; thus, proxying reputation
becomes a principal concern. There are numerous dif-
ferent measures available, but most relevant will be
either the previous season winning percentage or a
moving average of several previous seasons. Prior to
the start of a season past records and off-season ac-
quisitions are the only information fans have to judge
quality in the forthcoming season. Given the fact
that a team's winning percentage will fluctuate
throughout the season, we also have the interesting
case of current winning percentage, which at once
measures both reputation and current quality.
THE CASE OF REPUTATIONAL CAPITAL
Reputational capital could probably best be de-
fined as an intangible asset that results from previ-
ous product quality. An important note here is that
the reputational capital referred to here is not the
same as reputational capital derived from advertising.
Clearly there is a difference in the reputation earned
from producing a quality product year after year and
that earned by having a sports celebrity say, "This is
a great product," although in some cases they may
produce comparable increases in demand.
Often firms will use their achievements as a part
of an advertising campaign. For example auto ads will
frequently refer to industry surveys and product re-
views to attest to previous and present quality. This
makes it difficult to know just what is and what is
not a quality product. Baseball, on the other hand,
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has no such problems if we judge quality by winning
percentage. It would be difficult for a team with a
low winning percentage to claim to be a quality team
when anyone can look at the daily paper and find out
just the opposite. Therefore, in determining reputa-
tion derived from actual quality, a prime criterion
would be the objectivity of the major source of
product information. For many products the major
source of product information is advertising, whereas
with baseball the primary source of information will
be televised games, the daily newspaper and other
sports publications which report current statistics.
THE EFFECTS OF REPUTATIONAL CAPITAL
To demonstrate the theoretical effects of reputa-
tional capital we can look at a hypothetical auto
industry. For example, we have two new automobiles,
both cars are stylistically and mechanically identi-
cal. The only difference is that CAR A has been pro-
duced for ten consecutive years with a very high
rPr.ord of reliability and CAR B is entering its first
year on the market. If both cars were priced identi-
cally, it would be highly likely that CAR A would sell
better. The reverse can also be shown as well (ie. if
CAR A had a historically poor reliability record, we
would predict CAR B to sell better).
4
In essence, what reputational capital does is
shift a product's demand curve either to the right
(good reputation) or to the left (poor reputation).
Figure 1 shows that at time A an automaker builds a
quality car, which shifts the demand curve at time B
to the right. This occurs because people obtain in-
formation from sources such as customer satisfaction
surveys, auto magazines, and word of mouth which leads
them to believe that this is a quality car.
At time B the automaker again builds a quality
car, which shifts the demand curve at time C to the
right. At time C, the automaker builds a poor quality
car, which shifts the demand curve at time D to the
left. Restated, at every level of price we would pur-
chase fewer cars at time D than in time C.
EMPIRICAL FACTORS CONSIDERED
Professional sports lend themselves readily to
this type of analysis as a specific and easily identi-
fiable measure of quality exists. Unlike the case of
an auto industry, there is not a reliance on proxying
subjective variables such as comfort, styling, or some
other utility-bearing attribute. Hedonic pricing mod-
els and time allocation theory do, however, allow for
the empirical inclusion of such attributes. For base-
ball this would involve viewing the baseball game as a
5
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bundle of amenities and costs. For example, there
would be utility gained from the excitement of the
game and the time spent with family or friends, and
there would be opportunity costs involved since going
to a baseball game usually consumes a great deal of
time with transportation, planning, and the game it-
self. For the purposes of explaining and empirically
demonstrating the effects of reputation on demand,
however, a less complex model should suffice.
Here we will express demand for baseball such
that:
BD=f(P,I,p,Q,R,S,PS,o)
where BD = Yearly total attendance, P = population, I
= income, p = price, Q = quality, R = reputation, S =
substitutes, pS - price of substitutes, and o = other
unspecified factors.
Population will have a positive effect on demand
for baseball. Logically, if all other factors are
held equal we would expect a higher level of attend-
ance in Los Angeles than in Cincinnati. Scully (1984)
found that, holding ticket price and team quality con-
stant, an extra one million in population results in
approximately 180,000 in additional season
attendance.1 The definition of population would best
be specified using the Standard Metropolitan Statisti-
8
cal Area surrounding the baseball team's location.
We would expect baseball to be a normal good and
thus expect the income relationship to be positive.2
We would also expect price to have a negative effect
on attendance given the traditional price/demand rela-
tionship.
Product quality should have the most dominant ef-
fect on attendance. Current product quality is best
measured as season-winning percentage, although an al-
ternative would be to use the number of games behind
the division leader. Reputation, as mentioned before,
can be specified in numerous ways including the previ-
ous season-winning percentage, the mean-winning per-
centage of x number of previous seasons, or mean num-
ber of games behind the leader for x number of previ-
ous seasons, to name a few.
Substitute activities and the prices of those ac-
tivities would likely have only a small effect on sea-
sonal attendance because there are so few products
that are either perfect substitutes or closely related
substitutes. It can also be argued that there is no
substitute for a night at the ballpark!
Other unspecified factors would probably include
some of the hedonic variables and time allocation var-
iables discussed earlier. This would include the many
compliments to baseball consumption, such as quality
of the food at the stadium, convenience and costs of
parking facilities, aesthetic appeal of the stadium,
etc., generally things that will have some affect on
attendance, but would not fall into any of the tradi-
tional categories.
APPLICATIONS TO MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
For any given team in any given season the supply
of baseball seats is basically fixed - constrained by
the size of the stadium. Given this, we observe the
vertical supply curve shown in Figure 2. The demand
curve for baseball seats shown in Figure 2 is the tra-
ditional negatively sloped one. Baseball is a very
interesting case, however, in that as far as seats
available are concerned supply virtually never actual-
ly equals demand. Unlike other products, baseball
teams do not have the luxury of easily cutting back or
stepping up production when demand changes. Since
nominal ticket price is usually fixed throughout the
season, this means that we always have a surplus or a
shortage of baseball seats.3 Time A on Figure 2 shows
the normal situation during the season. At the given
price there is a surplus of seats, which is expressed
by the equation: Surplus = S - Ad.






FIGURE 2: Typical game-Fy-game suppiy ol seats and demand
for seats al Major League Baseball games
SUPPLY OF SEATS
Ad S Bd Cd Dd
QUANTITY DEMANDED
season when a team is in the middle of a pennant race.
The demand curve has shifted to the right far enough
so that at current ticket prices, which are set prior
to the start of the season, demand actually exceeds
supply and there is a shortage of seats, which can be
expressed by the equation: Shortage = S - Bd.
Time C, shows what might be the typical situation
during the divisional playoffs or the World Series-
where ticket prices are somewhat higher. The demand
curve has again shifted to the right, but there has
been an increase in prices. In this situation we again
have a shortage, but the shortage
rather than S-D.
TRADITIONAL MARKETING THEORY
Traditional marketing theory tells us that events
change the probability of purchasing a product and
that each time one purchases a product it increases
the probability that one will purchase it again in the
future.4 Noll (1974) estimates that roughly 10 to 20
percent of total season attendance is made up of sepa-
rate individuals, which shows that much of the total
attendance is made up of individuals who go to numer-
ous games.5 Other events that may lead to tickets be-
ing purhased are the growth in the number of televised
games, newspaper articles about the team, and word of
11
is only given by S-C
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mouth, each of which will be related to winning per-
centage or winning prospects.
Given all the different information people obtain
about baseball teams, traditional marketing analysis
can again be used to develop the notion of a team's
reputation. Levy (1978) notes that image includes
four principal factors:
1)Knowledge of technical matters
2)Awareness of other product characteristics
3)Beliefs about the value of the object
4)Judgments about the suitability of the brand6
A knowledge of technical matters would include
how well people interpret the team statistics and in-
dividual statistics of various players on a particular
team. An awareness of other product characteristics
would be an awareness of the quality of individual
players which tends to subjective, but is often inter-
preted as fact. Beliefs about the value of the object
would essentially come down to the individual's utili-
ty function and how highly a person values the
"experience" of attending the baseball game, measured
against cost considerations such as beer, food, park-
ing, souvenirs, tickets, gasoline and time. Suitabil-
ity of the brand would most likely involve geographic
considerations. In other words an individual living
in Akron would probably go see a Cleveland Indians
game played in Cleveland rather than a game played in
Oakland, California.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Several model specifications were used to quan-
tify the relationship between reputation, as measured
by past performance, and demand for baseball. In the
first series of models, cross-sectional data are used
to estimate the effects of reputation. In the second
series of models, time series data are used for sever-
al teams to quantify the effects of reputation through
time for those selected cities.
Model 1 is cross-sectional, using 1990 data from
24 of the 26 major league cities, Montreal and Toronto
excluded.7 I estimated the following equation using
ordinary least squares:
Attend - B1+ B2 Wpt + B3 WPt-1 B4 Employt + et
where Attend = Total season attendance
Wp = Winning Percentage
Employ = Employees on non-agricultural
payrollsB
Model 2 is an expansion specified:
Attend = Bl + B2 Dealt + B3 WPt..1 + B4 EmploYt
+ B5 DTt + e
where Deal = Ticket Price/Wpt
13
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DT = dummy variable
1 if two or more division titles
in the past five years
0 if less than two division
titles in the past five years
Attend, WP, and Employ are the same as in Model 1.
Model 2 is theoretically more appealling in that
it adjusts current quality for price discrepancies
and, due to the dummy, provides an additional measure
of reputation. The dummy is appropriate in this situ-
ation because a team that won championships recently
within the past five years may experience expanded at-
tendance that cannot be accounted for in the previous
season's winning percentage. Scully (1984) estimated
a similar model, excluding the dummy variable and us-
ing population instead of employment, with similar re-
sults9 (See Table 1).
All but the noted coefficients are significant at
the 90 percent level and all have the expected signs.
Using Model 1 in the log-linear format, the estimated
elasticity of demand with respect to winning percent-
age is 1.11 and the elasticity of demand with respect
to the previous season winning percentage is 1.16. In
neither case can we reject unitary elasticity. In
other words a 10 percent increase in either this sea-
son's attendance or the previous season's attendance
should result in roughly a 10 percent increase in at-
TABLE 1 Model 1 Model 2 Scully
Intercept -2328.12 580.87 947.90
(-2.81) (.77)* NR
WP-Deal 3926.21 -63.60 -101.91
(2.99) (-2.10) NR





















Model 2, which has approximately the same coef-
ficient for previous winning percentage, shows that
teams that won two or more division championships in
the past five years draw approximately 420,030 more in
attendance than had they not. Or stated another way,
there will be a rightward shift in the demand curve of
about 420,030 at every level of price.
The next series of models uses time series data
from 1947 to 1990 for Cleveland, Cincinnati, New York
(Yankees), Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and Boston. For
the three national league cities, Cincinnati, Pitts-
burgh, and Philadelphia, the models are specified as
the following:
Attend = B1 + B2 WPt + B3 WPt-1 B4 Aget
+ B5 Strk + B6 Timet + e
where Attend = Total season attendance
Wp = Season winning percentage
Age = Proxy for stadium age: series
begins at one in 1947 and in-
creases by one each season un-
til the year a new stadium is
introduced and then again
increases by one every season
Strk = Dummy variable to account for
the strike in 1981
Time = Linear time trend series begin-
ning at one in 1947 and ending
at 44 in 1990
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For the remaining American League cities the models
are specified as follows:
Attend = B1 + -2 R WP --t + - R3 WPt..1 + B4 Strkt
+ B5 Time + e
There will be no stadium effects reported for the
American League teams since none of the three teams
introduced a new stadium, although Yankee stadium did
undergo some improvements in 1975 and 1976.
Along with these specifications is an alternative
specification that substitutes a four-year moving
average winning percentage in place of the winning
percentage for the previous one season. This alterna-
tive should give some insight into the question of
whether fans put more emphasis on the "organization"
or if they simply make the decision to attend games
based on current expectations of winning. If a team
has a tradition of winning, current attendance might
be better estimated by using a variable which takes
this past success into consideration.
Table 2 data show the regression results for the
three National League cities and Table 3 data show re-
sults for American League cities. For each city, mod-
el I uses previous season attendance and model 2 uses
the four-year moving average winning percentage.
In all of the time series models the Cochrane-




















WP 3197.95 3590.49 2370.30 2582.32 1385.43 1334255
(5.66) (6.97) (4.67) (5.13) (5.25) (5.03)
PrevWP 1142.70 5446.47 1036.48 2475.64 1395.36 1650.25
(2.21) (3.72) (2.07) (2.43) (2.27) (-1.87)*
Age -22.57 -20.84 -35.99 -41.14 -16.05 -8.64
(-2.57) (-2.64) (-4.92) (-5.86) (-1.48)* (-1.02)*
Strike -1018.45 -1015.19 -879.24 -858.81 -555.69 -506.17
(-6.12) (-7.10) (-6.61) (-6.62) (-3.00) (-2.02)
Time 49.59 55.06 44.78 42.14 25.64 16.20
(4.89) (3.17) (4.94) (5.12) (1.29)* (2.85)
Rho .71 .81 .73 .70 .78 .30
Estimate (5.51) (8.19) (6.02) (5.89) (5.76) (1.61)*
N 38 ..38 3E1 38 •. •
Adjusted .92 .94 .94 .95 .64 .62
R2
F 75.47 90.83 105.18 110.52 11.97 10.91
*Insignificant at the 90% level
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TABLE 3 American League Sample: 1953-1990
Boston Cleveland New York
1 2 1 2 1 2
Constant-2106.38 -1585.92 -1737.90 -1338.79 -696.71 -2990.23













PrevWP 2309.82 1964.80 839.46 318.18 226.69 3713.39
(3.72) (.99)* (1.71)* (.32)* (.34)* (2.89)
Strike -854.83 -949.34 -643.24 -626.53 -705.59 -718.97
(-5.92) (-5.63) (-4.12) (-3.85) (-4.24) (-4.32)
Time 34.89 37.24 21.17 18.68 41.98 47.36
(5.92) (4.68) (5.03) (3.47) (3.11) (6.74)
Rho .56 .58 .27 .25 .77 .55
Estimate (3.76) (3.70) (1.71)* (1.58)* (7.34) (3.69)
N 38 38 38 38 38 38
Adjusted .91 .88 .66 .63 .84 .86
R2
F stat 77.04 53.74 15.11 13.37 39.39 44.81
*
Insignificant at the 90% level
19
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Orcutt technique is used to correct for autocorrela-
tion; thus estimated Rho and its t statistics are re-
ported with the other relevant summary statistics.
The regression results are interesting in that some of
the teams performed extremely well, while others were
only marginally successful. For Pittsburgh, Cleve-
land, and Boston, results were better when using Model
1, while Model 2 performed better for Cincinnati, New
York, and Philadelphid. These three teams are proba-
bly good examples of teams with strong
"organizational" followings, particularly in the cases
of Cincinnati and New York, where the coefficients for
the previous four seasons winning percentage actually
exceeds the coefficients for current season winning
percentage.
The results for Cincinnati and New York may have
something to do with the number of tickets sold on a
single game basis, the number of season tickets sold,
and the number of business tickets sold. For example,
the number of single game tickets sold is likely to be
highly influenced by the way the team is currently
performing. Season ticket sales, however, which are
sold prior to the start of the season, are likely to
be influenced by the previous season or several previ-
ous seasons. One explanation might be that teams like
21
Cincinnati and New York sell lower percentages of to-
tal ticket sales on a single game basis. In 1984, in
fact, these teams did sell a below-average proportion
of ticket sales on such a basis.1°
Using the log-linear transformation we can again
obtain elasticities for each city. Data in Table 4
show that only Boston could be considered unitary
elastic with respect to the previous season's attend-
ance, while Cincinnati, Boston, and New York could be
considered unitary elastic with respect to the mean
winning percentage for the previous four seasons.
With respect to current season attendance Table 4
data show that Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and
possibly Boston exhibit positive elasticity. In other
words, a certain percentage change in current winning
percentage will spurn a greater percentage change in
total attendance. Philadelphia exhibited unitary
elasticity and, interestingly, New York proved to be
inelastic.
Table 4 data show that, although these teams gen-
erally do not exhibit a one-for-one relationship be-
tween previous season winning percentage, or the
four-year moving average winning percentage, and at-
tendance, there is a positive relationship. More im-
portantly, these models show the relationship between





WP #1 1.84 1.59 to 2.09 Elastic
WP #2 1.64 1.38 to 1.90 Elastic
Previous WP .60 .35 to .85 Inelastic
Previous 4 WP .36 -.21 to .93 Inelastic
Cincinnati
WP #1 1.34 1.15 to 1.53 Elastic
WP #2 1.28 1.08 to 1.48 Elastic
Previous WP .47 .29 to .65 Inelastic
Previous 4 WP .84 .48 to 1.20 Unit Elastic
Pittsburgh
WP #1 1.34 1.06 to 1.62 Elastic
WP #2 1.46 1.16 to 1.76 Elastic
Previous WP .48 .23 to .73 Inelastic
Previous 4 WP -.43 -.80 to -.06 Inelastic
Boston
WP #1 1.31 1.07 to 1.55 Elastic
WP #2 1.08 .80 to 1.36 Unit Elastic
Previous WP .91 .68 to 1.14 Unit Elastic
Previous 4 WP .74 .13 to 1.35 Inconclusive
New York
WP #1 .59 .39 to .79 Inelastic
WP #2 .69 .49 to .89 Inelastic
Previous WP .04 -.17 to .25 Inelastic
Previous 4 WP 1.06 .59 to 1.53 Unit Elastic
Philadelphia
WP #1 .95 .78 to 1.12 Unit Elastic
WP #2 .98 .81 to 1.15 Unit Elastic
Previous WP .28 .11 to .39 Inelastic
Previous 4 WP .53 .17 to .89 Inelastic
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past performance and current attendance holds up over
time. Taking this into consideration, it is under-
standable why the results differ so much from city to
city considering the many changes that teams undergo
over time.
Another interesting point is that in the six
time series models only Boston exhibits unitary elas-
ticity with respect to the previous season's winning
percentage, while the cross-sectional model was fairly
convincing in showing unitary elasticity on average
throughout the league.
CONCLUSIONS
In reviewing the models, it can safely be said
that current winning percentage has a very strong im-
pact on attendance levels. In every model it proved
to be statistically significant and in every case, ex-
cept that of New York, either unitary elasticity or
positive elasticity is exhibited. This current win-
ning percentage reflects a team's current reputation
for winning on a game-to-game basis and, thus, is most
likely to affect single game ticket sales.
The previous season's winning percentage is a
measure of prospects for the current year in that it
is the main form of information available. This will
likely affect season and business ticket sales since
23
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they are often purchased prior to the season starting.
In the cross-sectional model the coefficient actually
turned out to be greater for the previous season win-
ning percentage than the current season winning per-
centage. In the time-series models the effects of the
previous season were statistically significant in ev-
ery case, except those of Cleveland and New York, but
were generally inelastic.
The four-year moving average winning percentage
would also mainly affect season ticket sales. This
variable is designed to measure the reputation that
has accumulated through the previous four seasons. In
ottr,r words, this measures reputation built up over
time rather than with current teams. This is due
primarily to the fact that individual teams and the
rest of the teams in the league are likely to change
in terms of talent levels over the course of several
seasons. For New York and Cincinnati a unitary elas-
tic relationship was exhibited.
To summarize, it can be said that professional
baseball, like most other products, has a reputational
factor which increases or decreases product demand
with changes in past and present quality. The models
specified are consistent with previous works in the




Gerald W. Scully, The Business gf Major League 
Baseball (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
(1989): P. 114.
Baseball should be a normal good in the sense that
since it is a fairly costly endeavor to go see a
baseball game we would expect more games to be at
tended as income increases. This is, however, an in-
teresting point in that Noll (1974) pp.121 found the
coefficient on per capita income to be negative and
statistically significant. This may well be a case
where at relatively high income levels baseball
games lose some of their "normalcy," because base-
ball is a time intensive endeavor. At higher income
levels time is valued more anJ thus the benefits of
going to a game no longer exceed the costs.
The actual supply and price of baseball in general
are, however, adjusted frequently. Quality-adjusted
price may exhibit a great deal of movement through-
out a season and owners can alter supply by purchas-
ing or trading for more talent.
Alfred A. Kuehn and Ralph L. Day,"Probabilistic Mod-
els of Consumer Buying Behavior, Journal of Market-
ing, October 1964, p. 53.
Scully, 1989, P. 103.
Sidney J. Levy, Marketplace Behavior (New York:
AMACOM, 1978): p. 168.
Data for baseball winning percentages are from The 
aports Encyclopedia: Baseball, by Neft and Cohen and
various issues of USA Today. Data for baseball at
tendances and ticket prices are from the Office of
Major League Baseball and various issues of USA To
day. Data for employees on non-agricultural payrolls
represent the data for June 1990 from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics' Employment and Earnings, September
1990.
Montreal and Toronto are excluded to avoid exchange
rate problems and to maintain continuity in the
category of employees on non-agricultural payrolls.
Although not perfectly correlated with population,
Employees on Non-Agricultural Payrolls will suffice
26
NOTES
for the purposes of this study since it gives a good
indication of city size.
9 Scully, 1989, p. 115.
10 From Scully, 1989, p. 103. The average percentage
of total ticket sales that were for single games in
1984 was 46.5%. For Cincinnati the percentage was
31.8% and 44.4% for New York. Data is from an
Ernst and Whitney report to Major League Baseball.
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